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Beyond China's Human Rights
Exceptionalism in Africa: Leveraging

Science, Technology and Engineering for
Long-Term Growth
JAMES THuo GATHII*

This brief response to Timothy Webster's article,
"China'sHuman Rights Footprintin Africa, "critically appraises China 's disavowal of human rights, the
rule of law and democracy in its African relations.
China has argued that its African relations are based
on the principles ofpolitical equality and reciprocity,
mutual trust and benefit, common prosperity, sincerity
and friendship. I critically evaluate this effort to redraw the boundaries between political and economic
interventionism. In so doing, I make two major
claims. First, viewing China's involvement in Africa
as purely orprimarily economic, and not interventionist, imperial orpolitical, is inaccurate. Second, to address Africa's development and human rights challenges, African countries must capitalize on the trade
and investment opportunities China and other countries provide by taking concerted measures to transform their dependency on primaryproducts by developing a productive base upon which competitive
industries could emerge to promote the kind of growth
that would inure positively for human rights. African
governments must develop relations with Chinese
firms and government that transfer skills and technology to African firms so that Africa can benefit from
Chinese expertise and knowledge as a positive strategyfor moving away from dependency on raw-material
production without value-addition.
*

Wing-Tat Lee Chair in International Law, Loyola University Chicago School of

Law. Thanks to Suzanne Hilal, Michael Westwood-Booth and Amy Briogoli for their
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

Timothy Webster valiantly argues that China's engagement
with Africa has "actually improved the human rights conditions of
millions of Africans," particularly in the educational, agricultural, infrastructural and medical fields.' Webster criticizes "Western analysts" who, he suggests, overstate the adverse consequences of China's presence in Africa. 2 These analysts, he asserts, have overlooked
the way China has positively contributed towards meeting Africa's
contemporary concerns and dire development needs. 3 He argues
against those who claim China is "simply draining Africa of natural
resources while buttressing its dictators."' 4 Webster claims that his
paper introduces Chinese perspectives as well as terms familiar to the
Global South into the discussion of Sino-African relations. 5 To blunt
"Western analysts"' pessimistic views of China's African imprint,
Webster contends that a "nuanced assessment" must include "the
hundreds of infrastructure projects, agricultural experiments, educational facilities, pilot projects and other components of Beijing's Africa policy." 6
Webster over-estimates China's contributions to human rights
1.

Timothy Webster, China's Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 626, 626 (2013).
2. Id. at 628.
3. Id. at 629.
4.

Id.

5. Id.at 631.
6. Id. at 630.
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in Africa because he focuses largely on short-term improvements in
social conditions whose long-term sustainability is unclear. In order
to establish the claim that the human rights situation has improved in
the long-term, China's African imprint has to be examined against a
different baseline than the one Webster provides.
He assumes that as currently structured, Chinese investments
in Africa are optimally designed to have long-term growth, and as
such, will continue to improve human rights conditions in Africa.
Webster's reliance on short-term improvements in the infrastructural, agricultural, as well as educational and medical fields, rather than on their long-term economic consequences, leads him to
over-estimate the value of these short-term improvements. This is
especially so in countries that suffer from the resource curse or the
borrowing privilege. Studies on similar assistance to African countries have suggested that apparent improvements won through development programs are short-lived. 7 Such programs seldom result in
improving long-term growth prospects for African countries. In this
response, I argue that there are ways of capitalizing on the opportunities created by the presence of foreign investors in Africa to improve
long-term economic growth and respect for human rights in both the
short and the long-term.
To reach the conclusion that China's massive involvement in
Africa results in positive human rights outcomes, Webster must assume that any improvement, no matter how small, in social or economic circumstances necessarily improves the human rights situation. This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, a large
percentage of China's investment in Africa is in natural resource extraction, which is overwhelmingly correlated with hindering, rather
than promoting economic growth. Further, Webster's analysis is
predicated on the unstated view that given Africa's dire needs in areas such as infrastructure, medical care and agriculture, any investment in these areas is necessarily good. 8 Such an analysis would invariably lead to a predictable conclusion: that China's African
presence is a win-win for Africa. This is an extremely low baseline
7. See, e.g., William Easterly, The Big Push Djei Vu: A Review of Jeffrey Sach 's The
End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 96 (2006);
William Easterly, Ross Levine & David Roodman, Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 774 (2004); see also DAMBISA MOyo, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT
WORKING AND How THERE IS ANOTHER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009); RASNAH WARAH,
MISSIONARIES,

MERCENARIES AND MISFITS: AN ANTHOLOGY

SEEING LIKE A STATE:

(2008);

JAMES C. SCOTT,

How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE

FAILED (1998).

8. See generally, Webster, supra note 1.
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to establish whether China's presence in Africa has a positive effect.
It is hard to find investments that would not meet the low threshold
of making some improvement or difference. In essence, establishing
if China's presence in Africa is more than merely ephemeral is important. This is particularly important in light of research showing
that although African countries have been the highest recipients of
foreign aid, they have also experienced the lowest economic growth
rates. 9
Second, China's involvement must be examined in the context of Africa's leadership. For the most part, the interests of Africa's leadership are not consistent with the majority of African people.' 0 The deals these leaders have entered into with China must
therefore be examined according to their ability to help African
economies attain long-term, self-sustaining growth. Politicians have
short time frames because they want to stay in office. They have
short time horizons because they want to show that they have done
something for their constituents within the electoral cycle rather than
in the long-term. For these politicians, voters make their decisions in
the short term. Thus, deals with China discount the long-term effects
of their actions because their time-horizon is limited to the electoral
cycle. In fact, Africa's economic challenges are closely associated
with decisions taken for short-term political reasons to guarantee
electoral vindication or selfish gain. 1' By only examining short-term
gains from China's investments in Africa, Webster's argument suffers from a similar lack of imagination. He fails to see the way the
relationship between Africa and China could work differently than at
the present. Even assuming Webster was right, he still does not see
the broad range of possibilities for re-characterizing the relationship
between China and Africa. Webster fails to appreciate how improved instruments that provide for transfer of technology and training might better protect human rights concerns in the long-term.
This response, therefore, joins a growing chorus that calls for
a more cautious, tentative approach to evaluating China's presence in
Africa. ' 2 In particular, I argue a big-picture analysis may not effec9.
10.

See Easterly, supra note 7, at 100.
See, e.g., GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA BETRAYED (1993).

11. A classic statement of this view is ROBERT H. BATES, ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RURAL AFRICA 146-47 (1983) ("Politicians want power. And they use the
instruments of the state to secure and retain it by manipulating the economy to political
advantage. In Africa . . .political elites have rendered economic markets instruments of
political organization.").
12. See, e.g., Uche Ewulukwa, Trade, Empires, And Subjects-China-Africa Trade, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 506 (2008) (calling for "guarded optimism regarding the
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tively capture the human rights effects of China's economic presence
in Africa. This response proceeds as follows: Part I examines the
consequences of China's redrawing of the boundaries between the
economy and human rights. Further, it argues China's disavowal of
human rights is an exercise of soft power that reinforces governance
problems particularly in resource-rich African countries. Part II proposes a long-term strategy for China-African relations that would
impact human rights positively in the long-term.
I. REDRAWING

THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE ECONOMY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS

In this part of the essay, I make three claims. First, Chinese
investment policies interfere with domestic political choices in African countries, notwithstanding Chinese rhetoric to the contrary. Second, the sheer size of Chinese investment into resource-rich, unstable
African countries enables their governments to disregard human
rights. Third, Chinese investment policies serve to further destabilize African governments and encourage corruption and disregard for
human rights by reinforcing the resource curse and the borrowing
privilege, which I define and discuss below at length. 13
China has argued its relations with African countries will not
interfere with their domestic political choices. According to this
principle of non-intervention, China will not and does not condition
its economic engagement in African countries on any country's human rights, democracy or rule of law record. 14
The assumption here is that human rights issues occupy a
sovereign domestic political sphere that should not be subject to interference since such an intrusion would constitute unwelcome interventions in a sovereign realm. As Webster notes, such interventions
deepening relationship" between China and Africa and noting that "African leaders must
push past Beijing's rhetoric of anti-hegemonism and develop clear policies to guide the
continent's engagement with China").
13. In brief, the resource curse refers to the inability of resource-rich African countries
like the Democratic Republic of Congo to enjoy peaceful extraction of their mineral
resources. The borrowing privilege refers to the power African countries have to contract
mineral resources without having to be accountable to their people.
14. Webster notes that "[C]hina does not inquire into the domestic political situation of
the partner country. If the partner provides what China needs ...China cares little whether
it is democratic or dictatorial." Webster, supra note 1,at 641. Further Webster notes that
"China firmly believes that it should not, and will not, engage in activities that infringe upon
the sovereignty of other nations." Id. at 640.
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would be regarded as a form of imperialism, precisely the kind of
imperialism that China disavows in its solidarity with African countries. 15
This view of China's involvement in Africa as purely or primarily economic (and therefore non-interventionist and non-imperial)
is inaccurate. China's economic involvement in Africa is not apolitical, or any different than that of Western countries which condition
certain forms of economic support on respect for human rights, goals
such as free and fair elections, or free market reforms. Providing
economic support without conditions is a political action because it
invariably and implicitly supports the regime in power and the current status quo.
My point here is that economic interventionism is no less objectionable than human rights interventionism. 16 It would be inaccurate to think of the private realm of economics as apolitical or neutral. This discredited view has been invoked to put brakes on the
goals of social justice in the economy, 17 and to support dubious prethe non-intervention norm does not
sumptions, such as the idea that
18
apply to economic measures.
These artificial distinctions, between a so-called political and
a so-called economic realm, are not reflected in reality or even in international law. In fact, the United Nations Declaration on Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United
Nations, provided that all forms of interference "against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, [in addition to armed intervention] are in violation of international law." 19 Similarly, the unanimously adopted United Nations
15. Webster seems to limit his definition of imperialism to the political sphere while in
fact imperialism has also been understood to apply in economic relations between the
countries that own vast amounts of capital and the destination countries of such capitaloften poor countries. See id. at 641-49. But see James T. Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism
and InternationalLaw, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1013, 1016 (2007) (arguing that there are a variety
of imperialisms which converge on external and internal actors acting to dominate and have
control over colonial peoples).
16. See also James T. Gathii, Neo-Liberalism, Colonialism and International
Governance: Decenteringthe InternationalLaw of GovernmentalLegitimacy, 98 MicH. L.

REv. 1996, 2025 (2000) (arguing that separating the economic and political sphere is to
make a "spurious distinction" that assumes that the "public sphere is a controversial and
political arena" while the private arena is a de-politicized regime based on consent).
17.

Id. at2027.

18. Id. at 2030.
19.

Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
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Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of196120 referred to both direct and indirect forms of intervention, as well as the "inalienable right" of every State to choose its
economic system without interference "in any form by another
state." 21 The point here is that conceptually, the distinction between
politics and economics is artificial, and it is deployed to foreclose
critical interrogations of economic relations between states. Merely
because African leaders have embraced economic relations with China does not immunize these agreements from international legal scrutiny when they result in massive violations of human rights in the resource extraction sector.22
China's claims that its economic engagement with Africa is
unproblematic because it is non-political are belied by international
legal principles that recognize that economic intervention is as objectionable as political interventions. China did not oppose the Declaration on Friendly Relations or the United Nations Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, or, in fact any
international legal instrument that declares sovereignty over the economic affairs of a country. In fact, China has argued strongly in favor of its sovereignty over its natural resources to defend itself
against charges of violating its World Trade Organization obligations. 23
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 121
(1970), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/principles1970.html.
The
declaration was adopted with a voice vote and China did not object or vote against it.
20. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965). The declaration was adopted by a vote of 109 votes with
one abstention from the United Kingdom. China voted in favor.
21. Id. 5.
22. For more on this point,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).

see JAMES

T. GATHII, WAR,

COMMERCE AND

23. Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R393, WT/DS398/AB/R398/R (July 5, 2011)
(showing China's argument that it had the sovereign right to "adopt a comprehensive and
sustainable mineral conservation policy, taking into account China's social and economic
development needs" and further that "Article XX(g) [of the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs] must be interpreted in a manner that recognizes a WTO Member's sovereign
rights over their own natural resources"). China claims that these rights must be exercised
in the interests of a Member's own social and economic development, as well as in light of
the objective of sustainable development as stated in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement.
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One legitimate response to my claim here is that African
states have voluntarily consented to China's increasing economic

presence in Africa. That is true. However, that is a beginning of
China-Africa relations and it cannot be the benchmark for assessing
China's contributions and Africa's gain. China understands the deep
ideological commitment of African leaders to the values of autonomy, sovereignty and independence. These values have particularly
strong resonances in light of the colonial history of many African
countries, and in light of the post-colonial continuation of this legacy

through Western conditionality, that is, the practice of conditioning
loans or other forms of development aid on the satisfaction of certain
conditions, often including human rights or rule of law demands.
China's approach to Africa demonstrates its understanding that 'revo-

lutionary ideologies' such as non-intervention and sovereignty continue to be, for African leaders, "a source of independent strength
and resistance"

24

against the policies of Western countries. These

ideologies shape and create realities in the way African leaders un25
dertake their foreign policies.

Second, China's massive economic involvement in Africa
cannot simply be re-conceptualized or re-characterized as falling outside the realm of human rights, democracy or the rule of law. This

redrawing of the boundary between the public and private spheres to
exclude the economic realm from the political realm, or vice versa,
has widely been recognized as one of the ways in which international

financial institutions sought to insulate their problematic economic
programs imposed on developing countries from criticism based on
China posits that sustainable development requires that economic development and
conservation be aligned through the effective management of scarce resources, as the term
"conservation" refers to the management of a limited supply of exhaustible natural
resources over time. China considers that its export restraints "relate to conservation"
because they are part and parcel of China's measures that manage the "limited supply of
refractory-grade bauxite and fluorspar, which are exhaustible natural resources." Id.
7.364.
24. PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER 1N SOCIAL LIFE 120-21 (1964).
25. Indeed as Condoleezza Rice argues, while ideology "is clearly not a sole
determinant of foreign policy preferences, [it] continues to play an important part in coloring
political leaders' perceptions of their environment. It is not that ideology is a blueprint.
Rather, it is a constraint upon the imagination of political leaders. It limits alternatives
because some are judged to be out of the realm of the possible. Unlike capabilities, which
can be acquired through effort and devotion of resources, ideology can be difficult to alter."
Condoleezza Rice, The Military as an Instrument of Influence and Control, in DOMINANT
POWERS AND SUBORDINATE STATES: THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET
UNION INEASTERN EUROPE 242 (Jan E. Triska, ed. 1986). See also BLAU, supra note 24, at
122-23.
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values arising from concern for human rights, the rule of law or de26
mocracy.
These institutions argued that these economic programs were
technocratic and neutral since they were predicated on rationally
made choices. Such thinking has since been debunked, and economic relations between countries and with international financial institutions are no longer regarded as providing a safe harbor from human
rights scrutiny. 27 Such a safe harbor would ignore the progress made
in dissolving and overcoming distinctions between economic and political spheres, especially in light of the imposition of neo-liberal
economic reform over the last several decades. 28 In the international
trade context, the Director General of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), Pascal Lamy, has argued that "trade and human rights go
hand in hand," and gone are the days when trade was thought of
without reference to human rights norms. 29 For this reason, the
World Bank would, in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, be
hard pressed to argue as it did in 1969 that lending money to apartheid South Africa was consistent with its non-political mandate. 30
Similarly, it would be simplistic to argue that China's economic investments in Africa are invariably good for human rights.
Indeed, economic investment can be harmful to human rights as the
history of investments in resource-rich unstable African countries
demonstrates. 31 As such, arguing that foreign investment is always
26. Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions
After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443,476 (1997).
27. Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second GenerationReforms
and the Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL

APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). Rittich, however, notes that
notwithstanding the inclusion of goals to achieve social justice and democratic objectives
within the World Bank's agenda, the "recognition of human rights has not paved the way
toward a smooth incorporation of social issues into the larger economic project." Id. at 244.
28. See, e.g., Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The
Realization of Social, Economic and CulturalRights: Globalization and Its Impact on the
Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, PreliminaryReport Submitted by Joe Oloka Onyango &
Depeeka Udagama in accordance with Sub-Commission Resolution 1999/8, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (June 15, 2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/

GlobalizationOloka-Onyango,Udagama.pdf.
29. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Trade and Human Rights Go Hand in Hand,
Speech to UNITAR, (Sept.
news_e/sppLe/sppl 172_e.htm.

26,

2010),

available at http://www.wto.org/english/

30. James T. Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to
Oppositionaland Transformative Social Projects in InternationalLaw, 5 BUFF. HuM. RTS.
L. REV. 107, 157 n. 98 (1999).
31.

See sources cited supra note 7.
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good would be eerily similar to the claims made by international financial institutions in the 1990s. At first, these institutions asserted
that governmental austerity and reductions in spending were an essential part of structural adjustment and that their effects, though
painful at first, were invariably good. As this assertion proved false,
the institutions changed their demands. 32 Unlike in the early 1990s,
economic austerity was no longer regarded as invariably good for the
countries upon which it was imposed. As a result, poverty alleviation
strategies became part of the World Bank's programs for poor countries.
African and other developing countries have made important
claims in seeking to reshape international economic institutions, rules
33
and practices so that they can be more beneficial to those countries.
It would be great if China were a collaborator in these efforts, rather
than merely replacing or adding to the contemporary set of international economic governance structures under, and within, which African states operate. China can offer an economic model to African
and other non-Western countries that differs from the Western neo34
liberal model.
Chinese investment policies interfere with domestic political
choices. For this reason, they have political effects in African countries that China pretends to ignore in a variety of ways. First, China's
economic investments have been welcomed by African leaders as a
way of limiting the political influence of Western states that comes
with Western investment. 35 Clearly, political choices to welcome
32. Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A
Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learningfrom a Decade of

Reform, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 973 (2006).
33. James T. Gathii, Third World Approaches to InternationalEconomic Governance,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE, 255 (Richard Falk et
al. eds., 2008).
34. See Carmen Gonzalez, China's Engagement with Latin America: Partnershipor
Plunder?, in

NATURAL

RESOURCES

AND

THE GREEN ECONOMY:

RE-DEFINING

THE

(Elena Merino-Blanco & Jona
Razzaque eds., 2012). Gonzalez notes that rather than providing an altemative economic
model to Latin America, China threatens to reinforce the region's "economically
disadvantageous and ecologically unsustainable specialization in the production of primary
commodities... and to retard the evolution of more dynamic economic sectors that promise
higher wages and revenues." Id. at 4.
CHALLENGES FOR PEOPLE,

35.

STATES AND CORPORATIONS

Allan Odhiambo, Nairobi deepens China Ties in Bid to Drive Key Sectors' Growth,

Bus. DAILY, Mar. 21, 2012, available at http://www.trademarksa.org/news/nairobi-deepenschina-ties-bid-drive-key-sectors-growth (noting that since 2004, the Kenyan government has
increasingly turned to the East rather than the West for foreign direct investment,
infrastructure development and other forms of economic cooperation). See also Uch& U.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[51:664

and promote Chinese investments at the expense of Western investments cannot simply be seen as neutral or apolitical. Second, China's investments in Africa have political effects, the most obvious
being protraction of the resource curse in unstable African states.
Third, I have argued that Chinese investments in Africa must be understood in the context of the non-intervention norm, which incorporates limits on interference in the economic affairs of a state. 36 To do
otherwise would be to draw an unwarranted conceptual boundary of
the complex and fluid relationship between politics, on the one hand,
and economics, on the other. Ultimately, there is little evidence that
China is offering Africa an alternative to the economic orthodoxy of
neo-liberalism. The bilateral investment treaties that China is signing
with African countries are copies of those used by Western countries. 37 Most importantly, as I note in Part II, China's investment
strategy in Africa is not premised on promoting Africa's long-term
economic growth. This investment does not offer the prospects for
long-term sustained growth that China itself pursued successfully.
A. Disavowal of Human Rights as Chinese Soft Power
There is a danger that China's massive economic influence
vis-d-vis African countries could be masked by China's soft powerits disavowal of human rights and the restrictive and patronizing conditions that characterize access to development financing and other
economic benefits from the United States and Western countries.
In contrast to Western countries, China does not condition access to concessional financing and other economic benefits on conformity with human rights norms or on a set of economically or politically restrictive demands. China argues that its Africa relations are
based on the principles of political equality and reciprocity, mutual
trust and benefit, common prosperity, sincerity and friendship. 38
Ewelukwa, South-South Trade and Investment: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly-African
Perspectives, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 513, 515 (2011) (noting the "steady but gradual shift in
power away from the United States and Europe").
36.

See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.

37.

Ewelukwa, supra note 35, at 571.

38.

China'sAfrican Policy, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA (Jan. 12, 2006), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm. See also Beijing
Declarationof the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,
16-17, (July 20, 2012), available at http://www.nepad.org/nepad/knowledge/doc/2775/
beijing-declaration-fifth-ministerial-conference-forum-china-africa-coopera;
Never to Change Friendship Policy Towards Africa, FORUM ON

China Vows
CHINA-AFRICA

COOPERATION (FOCAC) (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/t880445.htm.
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This approach allows China to appear to be a neutral party that, unlike its Western competitors, does not interfere in the domestic affairs
of African countries. These policy positions, including China's stated commitment to non-intervention, have resulted in many African
governments increasingly turning to China and other non-European,
non-Western countries that have adopted similar policy stances for
further economic cooperation. 39
The African leaders who have increasingly turned towards
China have expressed frustration with Western countries that explicitly exercise reward-based power in Africa. These leaders are critical
of the use of conditions such as cutting off access to economic resources to punish countries that do not meet prescribed conditions,
while rewarding those that meet them. Such African leaders regard
China favorably because in order to trade with China they need not
live under the threat of withdrawal of access to resources. By disavowing such conditions and adopting a more attractive set of principles for its African foreign policy, China has charmed its way into
40
Africa. In effect it has adopted a soft-power approach.
Under this soft-power approach, China realized the importance of values such as equality, non-interference, prestige and
sovereignty among African leaders as well as their often-extreme
aversion to ostracism and attacks on legitimacy. China's soft power
therefore lies in strategically recognizing and appropriating a different lexicon for its Africa relations that is geared towards conferring
prestige while avoiding ostracism of African governments.
Western conditionality has often enabled African governments to appropriate readily the legacy or remnants of anti-colonial
nationalism to criticize Western powers. The persistence of anticolonial nationalism within African States, even as they have rapidly
embraced neo-liberalism, is both a function of the continuities of
Western dominance in new forms and guises, but also a cover or subThe head of Chinese delegation visiting Namibia told reporters that "sincerity, equality and
mutual benefit, solidarity and common development are the principles guiding the ChinaAfrica exchange and cooperation and the driving force behind lasting China-Africa
relations." Id. See also Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, 20072009, FOCAC (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t280
369.htm; The Fifth Ministerial Conference of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
Beijing Action Plan, 2013-2015, FOCAC (July 23, 2012), http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/
dwjbzjjhys/t954620.htm.
39. See supra note 35.
40. Joanne Wagner, "Going Out: " Is China's Skillful Use of Soft Power in SubSaharan Africa a Threat to U.S. Interests?, 64 JoINT FORCE Q. 99 (2012), available at
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinas-use-of-soft-power.html.
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terfuge for the excesses of African governance. The continuing use
of anti-colonial nationalism to critique untoward external interference, whether real or perceived, functions to raise the political costs
for Western countries when they criticize African countries. China's
Africa policy means that it is for the moment unlikely to be branded
41
as a colonial overlord by African leaders.
In the end, African countries are not completely switching
economic, political, ideological or military patrons from the West to
the East. Rather, many African countries are exploiting the arrival of
China on the global scene as yet another patron to advance their own
short-term interests. That is why, while the African Union has accepted the Chinese gift of a brand new Headquarters Building in Addis Ababa, it is still engaged with the West through programs such as
the New Economic Partnership for African Development. 42
The de-coupling of Chinese investment in Africa from human
rights concerns enables African governments to disregard human
rights in a way that reliance solely on Western investment would not
permit. This de-coupling is very convenient for African politicians
who are primarily concerned with demonstrating short-term gains to
justify staying in office, rather than taking the trouble to create longterm growth. The time horizon for politicians to demonstrate they
have done something for their citizens is within the electoral cycle
rather than in the long-term. Because voters make their decisions in
the short term, politicians making deals with China discount the longterm effects of their actions. In fact, Africa's economic challenges
are closely associated with decisions taken for short-term political
reasons to guarantee electoral vindication.
B. Democracy in InternationalEconomic Relations but Not Within
African Countries
While China disavows intervening politically within African
countries, it nevertheless supports "democracy in international relations" 43 and claims to work towards upholding the purposes and
41. Civil society groups and opposition politicians in Africa are generally more willing
to criticize the downsides of China's presence in Africa.
42. James T. Gathii, A CriticalAppraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa's
Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, 13
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2003).

43. See SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE, OUTCOMES OF THE FIFTH
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION 5
3.2 (2012),
available at

http://www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/SAFPICompilation_01-
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principles of the United Nations. 44 China's relations with Africa are
based on a statist model. China negotiates with African States rather
than with civil society groups or other non-State actors. While China
and African countries argue that China's interests in Africa are for
the benefit of African people, the assumption here that African States
are invariably acting in the interest of African peoples is not always
accurate. 45 Dealing directly with African States enables China to
benefit from contractual and other deals negotiated without much
46
transparency or accountability.
Given that human rights fall within the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it is plausible to argue that China's disavowal of human rights in its relations with African countries may in
certain cases result in acquiescing to massive violations of human
rights by African governments. China's choice not to make human
rights part of its engagement with Africa makes it a very attractive
partner to African governments who are very wary of foreign countries pointing out their human rights violations.
Perhaps for this reason, China re-evaluated its stance in Sudan
where it initially claimed that its investment in the oil industry there
was simply economic. 47 Subsequently, China appointed an emissary
to address the genocide going on in Darfur. 48 The Darfur case does
FOCACVOutcomes_0.pdf.
44. Id.at 5 3.1.
45. See Ewelukwa, supra note 35, at 568 ("In part because of China's state-centric
approach to African diplomacy, much secrecy surrounds China's day to day activities in the
region from negotiations for important contracts to their eventual execution. Secrecy is
especially damaging in the South-South context because presently most of the activities
implicate natural resources where human rights and environmental pollution are rife and
where long-term development goals could be compromised with the stroke of a pen.").
46. Bribe Payers Index 2011: When China Goes Shopping Abroad, TRANSPARENCY
INT'L (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://blog.transparency.org/2011/10/31/when-chinagoes-shopping-abroad-new-pressure-for-corporate-integrity (detailing details of corruption
involving Chinese companies in Africa). See also PETER ROSENBLUM & SUSAN MAPLES,
CONTRACTS CONFIDENTIAL:

ENDING SECRET DEALS IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

15

(2009) (noting that "contract transparency is essential for the responsible management of
natural resources and the potential for growth and economic development that those
resources can provide"). By contrast, the report notes that "without contract transparency,
fears of the worst flourish, and mistrust and conflict are magnified among stakeholders." Id.
at 16.
47. Gaafar Karrar Ahmed, The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict (South African
Inst. of Int'l Aff., Occasional Paper No. 67: China in Africa Project, 2010), available at
www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SAIIA-TheChineseStanceontheDarfurConflict
.pdf
48. Id. (describing China's shift in policy from unconditional support for Sudan to a
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not, however, represent a shift in China's adamant position not to engage in human rights diplomacy or conditionality in its African relations.49
C. Reinforcing the Resource and BorrowingPrivileges
By delinking its economic involvement from concern for human rights, China effectively reinforces the ability of undemocratic
leaders in Africa to contract away African resources with little or no
accountability while borrowing unlimited amounts of money, in essence further mortgaging Africa's future. The importance of accountability is underlined by the fact that for the most part African
countries earn only one percent of their GDP from the extraction of
minerals from their countries even though minerals account for seventy percent of their total exports. 50 In 2007, China imported thirty
percent of its oil from African countries. 51 Since China is the leading
importer of mineral resources from Africa, the benefits of these increased flows will only go to the small sub-set of African countries
52
that have large mineral and oil deposits.
One of the dangers to human rights posed by China's massive
interest in African natural resources in countries with very poor governance is what is referred to as the resource curse. 53 Countries expemore nuanced position starting in mid-2004 reflected in part by the appointment of a Special
envoy for African affairs who would be responsible for Darfur affairs). See also
Explanatory Statement by Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya on the Vote on Security
Council Resolution on Darfur, Sudan (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.chinaun.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/darfur/t269767.htm
("China
continues to support firmly the peace process in Sudan and the relevant decisions of the
African Union in this regard. We call upon all major parties to act in a good faith, show
mutual respect and understanding, continue to conduct frank dialogue, increase mutual trust
and reinforce cooperation, so as to create good political conditions for the final settlement of
the Darfur issue.").
49. Notably, I do not presume that human rights conditionality as undertaken by
Western countries is the path that China-African relations should take to promote human
rights. I outline my proposed approach in Part II below.
50. Avantika Chilkoti, Africa's Extractive Industries: Dividing the Spoils, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/17/africas-extractive-

industry-dividing-the-spoils/.
51.

IFEOMA EZEOKAFOR ET AL., HUNTING OVERSEAS:

CHINA'S ENERGY NEEDS AND

EFFECTS ON OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2007).
52. Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects-China-Africa Trade: A
New Fair Trade Arrangement, or The Third Scramble for Africa?, 41 VANDERBILT J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 536 (2008).

53.

PAUL COLLIER & BENEDIKT GODREIS, COMMODITY PRICES, GROWTH, AND THE
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riencing the resource curse have high foreign investment in their extractive sectors and weak governance structures. Poor governance, in
turn, allows for corruption or rent-seeking behavior on the part of
mineral extraction firms. In essence, poor governance allows companies to get a sweet deal on mineral extraction by bribing officials
or avoiding government regulation. This allows for the sellers to
maintain a high margin while maintaining a low market price on the
world market.
The ability of a government, regardless of how it came to
power, to borrow on behalf of the entire country, and, in turn, give
international legal validity to the debt has been referred to as the "international borrowing privilege." 54 According to Thomas Pogge, the
international borrowing privilege hinders the development of democracy in developing countries in three ways. First, it allows an undemocratically elected government to remain in power even where
there is opposition with popular support. This is because such governments can acquire funds from outside the country at low rates. In
such cases, leaders have no need to rely on taxable income to sustain
the national income base. Second, since there is no global way to ensure that the current government came to power democratically, it increases the risk of a coup or revolution as an incentive is created to
grab power and inherit the borrowing privilege. Finally, it hinders
the ability of any democratically elected government to govern effectively, as they will be saddled with debt acquired from the previous
regime resulting in reduced ability to enact legal reforms necessary
for running a country.55
This borrowing privilege also means that rulers do not have to
rely on taxation to run the country. For this reason, continuously low
wages and low wage growth are not as much of a concern as in democratic countries. In essence, the borrowing privilege allows corrupt,
non-democratic governments to indebt their countries and future
governments even though much of the borrowed money may very
well end up lining the pockets of corrupt leaders.
The international borrowing privilege gives unaccountable
leaders "the power to effect legally valid transfers of ownership
rights" in natural resources. 56 A government that comes to power
through a coup, junta or any other illegal means is able to sell the
RESOURCE CURSE: RECONCILING A CONUNDRUM 2 (2009), availableat http://users.ox.ac.uk/
-econpco/research/pdfs/CommodityPricesGrowthV 1-1 .pdf.
54.

THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 120 (2d ed. 2008).

55. Id.
56. Id. at 119.
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country's natural resources to third parties. These third parties inherit all of the legal rights to the resources and are protected under international law from anyone challenging their rights to the possession of
such resources. 57
Another danger with nontransparent Chinese investments in
Africa is that they are likely to provide a platform for opposition politics and the accompanying prospect of mass protests that may trigger
political crises, as in certain resource-rich Latin American countries.
There are already opposition politicians who employ such tactics in
countries such as Zambia and Namibia. 58 The challenge here is that,
given the massive demand for African resources, particularly from
China, mass protests could become a normalized form of political
voice which comes with the increased propensity to create instability
59
and trigger descent into political disarray.
In short, countries rich in mineral resources without strong institutions have high levels of corruption and conflict, low levels of
economic growth and weak development of human resources. 60 That
is why having China commit to important principles of extractive industry governance remains crucial. There are many options China
could look to, including the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is a multi-stakeholder initiative of governments, companies and civil society groups that promotes transparency in the taxes and royalties paid for extractive resources. 61 Under
57. Id.
58. The Chinese in Africa: Trying to Pull Together, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/18586448. See also Alex Thurston, Zambia's Sata Has
African Incumbents, and China on Edge, WORLD POL. REv., Oct. 3 2011, http://

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10200/zambias-sata-has-african-incumbents-andchina-on-edge (analyzing how the opposition leader, Michael Sata, electorally defeated the
incumbent president in Zambia by running on a popular anti-China platform, coming in the
wake of the mine riots). In Lesotho, the opposition All Bathoso Convention (ABC), a
populist political party, has gained popular support as Chinese traders begin displacing
African traders.

See Lesotho: Anti-Chinese Resentment Flares, IRINNEWS.ORG, Jan. 24,

2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/76405/LESOTHO-Anti-Chinese-resentment-flares.
59. See Mason Moseley et al., The Normalization of Protestin Latin America, 42 AM.
BAROMETER INSIGHTS 1, 5 (2010), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/
I0842en.pdf
60. Barbara Hogenboom & Alex E. Fernindez Jilberto, The New Left and Mineral
Politics: What's New?, 87 EuR. REv. LATIN Am. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 93, 99 (2009),
available at http://www.cedla.uva.nl/50-publications/pdf/revista/87RevistaEuropea/87-HO
GENBOOM&FERNANDEZJILBERTO-ISSN-0924-0608.pdf.
61.

See

Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative ("EITI"),

http://www.re-

assurance.co.uk/resource-centre/sector-specific-initiatives/the-extractive-industriestransparency-initiative-%28eiti%29/

(last visited Apr. 9, 2013).

See also The EITI
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this initiative, Chinese companies would publish what they pay for
all oil, gas and mining activities. This "publish what you pay" approach is intended to ensure that citizens of resource-rich countries
benefit from their natural wealth.
My claim in this sub-part of the essay has been that Chinese
investment policies, particularly in resource-rich African countries,
have a propensity to destabilize fragile states and to encourage corruption and disregard for human rights. In my view, this would further reinforce the resource curse and resource privilege already prevalent in these countries.

II.

STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AS THE BEST GUARANTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LONG-TERM

In this Part of my response, I argue that Webster's essay suffers from a lack of imagination regarding the broad range of possibilities for re-characterizing the relationship between China and Africa.
Altering the terms according to which China invests in Africa with a
view to promoting long-term economic growth could lift millions
from poverty and definitively improve human rights conditions.
Webster does not tell us how Africa can take advantage of its economic relations with China to improve human rights in a sustainable
way over the long-term. To improve human rights conditions in Africa requires doing there what China has done over the last several
decades at home: structurally transforming from an agrarian to an
industrial economy that produces manufactured goods and services. 62
China has accomplished this transition by embracing foreign investment as a conduit for "learning by doing." 63 As part of their investments in China foreign enterprises transferred managerial and export
marketing technology. China is well poised to do the same for Africa, particularly in science, engineering and technology and thus
greatly aid in this process. 64
While China has certainly contributed to some economic
Principlesand Criteria,http://eiti.org/eiti/principles (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
62. Oyejide Titiloye Ademola et al., China-Africa Relations: Insights from AERC
Scoping Studies, 21 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 485, 488 (2009).
63. Chung Chen et al., The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China's Post-1978
Economic Development, 23 WORLD DEV. 691, 700 (1995).
64. Calestous Juma, The China-Africa Bond: Science, Technology and Engineering
Diplomacy, CAIJ1NG ANN. EDITION: FORECASTS & STRATEGIES 171 (2012), available at
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/caijing-2012-juma-china-africa-eng.pdf.
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growth in countries that have oil and minerals, this contribution will
only increase Africa's dependency on exporting low-cost raw materials. 65 Oil and mineral exports should not take the place of the industrialization of African economies. In addition, resource-induced
growth in a number of African countries is hardly shared equitably
because of the kind of governance problems described in Part I. This
does not augur well for human rights in Africa in the long haul. Not
only is demand for extractive resources such as oil and minerals
highly volatile, but these resources are also finite and exports to fulfill China's huge demand are concentrated in only a handful of African countries. 66 Further, commodity booms will not last into the future, and China well understands this as evidenced by export
67
restrictions on its own natural resources and rare earth minerals.
Africa will have to create self-sustaining growth to best guarantee the
enjoyment of human rights.
To do so, African countries must move away from resource
dependency towards exporting high-value products and services. African countries must pursue innovation-seeking investments and not
remain content with resource- and market-seeking investments from
China and elsewhere. 68 There must also be productivity-enhancing
technology transfers 69 in the manufacturing and services sectors with
a view to laying a long-term economic and social foundation on
which human rights can thrive. As the United Nations Development
Program noted in its 2001 Human Development Report, Making New
Technologies Work for Human Development, policy rather than char65. Jacob Zuma, the current South African President, has also declared that China's
current economic relations with Africa are not sustainable in the long-term. See Leslie
Hook, Zuma Warns on Africa's Ties to China, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2012), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33686fc4-dl 71 -11 e I -bbbc-00 144feabdc0.html#axzz2AiOJON1A.
66. These countries are Sudan, Congo, Angola, Zambia and South Africa.
Ademola et al., supra note 62, at 491.

See

67. See Julia Ya Qin, Reforming WTO Disciplineon Export Duties: Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, Economic Development and Environmental Protection, 46 J. WORLD
TRADE 1147, 1175-76 (2012).
68.

Simon Zadek et al., Business in Africa: ChineseBusiness Leaders' Perspectives on

Performance & Enhancement Opportunities46 (Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative,
Working Paper No. 54, 2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/
publications/workingpaper_- 54_zadeketal.pdf.
69. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines technology transfers
as "a series of processes for sharing ideas, knowledge, technology and skills with another
individual or institutions . . . and of acquisition by the other of such ideas, knowledge,
technologies and skills." WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Transfer of
Technology, No. SCP/14/4/REV (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/scp/en/scp_16/scp_14-4 rev.pdf.
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ity will be more significant in determining whether new technologies
become a tool for human development. 70
There is no evidence that African countries are systematically
negotiating joint ventures in infrastructure and other technologyintensive projects being undertaken by Chinese firms in Africa with
the purpose of enhancing human development and in effect reducing
poverty and increasing respect for human rights. Instead, some African governments are negotiating resources for infrastructure projects
under which African governments exchange resources in return for
infrastructure built by the Chinese. 7 ' These countries are missing out
on the significant opportunity that China, and indeed other foreign
investors, offer to developing domestic technological and other capacities that African countries do not currently have. 72 China's involvement gives African countries a significant opportunity to aim
systematically for technological change and to support the innovative
capacity of African firms by learning from Chinese firms. This will
require African governments to take advantage of China's massive
needs for African resources and markets to accumulate domestic
technological capabilities through joint ventures that present opportunities for borrowing, learning and imitation. The idea here is that
these relationships will help African countries build new production
structures that would have high-value addition. 73
In 2008, a variety of Chinese entities in Africa completed
over 3,000 engineering contracts funded by African governments and
70. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: MAKING NEW
TECHNOLOGIES WORK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2001), available at http://hdr.undp.org/

en/reports/global/hdr2001/.
71. Vivian Foster et al., Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure
Financierfor Sub-Saharan Africa: Executive Summary, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTAFRICA/Resources/BBFinalExecsummary EnglishJulyO8_Wo-Embg.pdf.
For
criticism of resources for infrastructure deals see Nathan W. Meyers, China's Dangerous
Game: Resource Investment and the Future of Africa, INT'L POLICY DIGEST, Oct. 29, 2012,

available at http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/1 0/09/chinas-dangerous-gameresource-investment-and-the-future-of-africa/.
72. I do not presume that African countries will necessarily follow China or other
countries on a linear path towards industrialization. However, I do believe China has much
to offer African countries to meet their long-term needs based on China's experience and
expertise that African governments have done little to capitalize on effectively. On the
variety of paths available to technology proficiency, see U.N. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION,

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002-2003:
INNOVATION AND LEARNING (2003).

COMPETING THROUGH

73. For a comparative experience, see Mario Cimoli & Jorge Katz, StructuralReforms,
Technological Change and Economic Development: A Latin American Perspective, 12
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 387 (2003).
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banks. 74 In essence, African countries have enormous opportunities
to develop technical expertise that can produce high-value export
products and services through these contractual arrangements. An
early empirical study in the manufacturing sector has concluded that
Africa's trade openness with China is unlikely to raise economic
growth and living standards. 75 This is not good news for human
rights in Africa.
China's massive involvement in African infrastructural development alone presents important opportunities for developing
productive capacity through joint ventures that transfer technology in
engineering, construction and related fields. In fact, for Africa to develop productivity-enhancing manufacturing that would compete
with enterprises in countries like China, African countries must structure mutually beneficial deals with Chinese firms and firms from developed economies. Such deals could include joint ventures that effectively transfer the technology and skills to African firms.
Furthermore, Chinese firms can help African firms add value to African exports and to "position themselves to benefit from world markets, not least the rapidly expanding Chinese market." 76 China and
Taiwan have vast experience in getting their enterprises to compete
in important global value chains. In Lesotho, for example, Taiwanese firms have successfully exploited the opportunities presented by
the African Growth and Opportunity Act to gain access to the U.S.
textile market. 77 The challenge for governments like Lesotho is to
translate the presence of foreign-owned corporations in their economies into the development of large-scale production capabilities, as
well as new capabilities "to produce increasingly sophisticated goods
and devices" 78 that have higher profit margins and less elastic demand than the commodities that predominate Africa's exports.
74. China's Growing Role in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112 th Cong. 13-24
(2011) (testimony of Deborah Brautigam, Professor at American University).
75. Juliet U. Elu & Gregory N. Price, Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing
Technology to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms, 22 AFR. DEV.

REv. 587, 595 (2010).
76. Jian-Ye Wang & Abdoulaye Bio-Tchan&, Africa's Burgeoning Ties With China:
Maximizing the Benefits of China's IncreasingEconomic Engagement With Africa, 45 FIN.
& DEV., 44, 44 (2008).

77. Lawrence Edwards & Robert Lawrence, Agoa Rules:

The Intended and

Unintended Consequences of Special Fabric Provisions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. 16623, 2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/
w16623.pdf.
78. Id. at 4.
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Let us take the road construction industry as an illustration of
how heavy outlays of Chinese firms in Africa can help develop new
technological and engineering experience and expertise for African
firms. In many African countries, in the last several decades, large
infrastructural contracts were awarded to locally-owned firms that
did not have the technology, experience and expertise to undertake
the projects. 79 Locally-owned firms were protected from foreign
firm competition through shadowy procurement processes in which
government bureaucrats got handsome kickbacks. 80 These locallyowned firms had no incentive to employ qualified engineers or other
skilled personnel. These firms rarely invested in high-end road
building technology. As a result, many African countries did not
take advantage of the opportunities that experience in road building
created in earlier decades. In the meantime, engineering and
science 81 education in many African countries has lagged far behind
nationally set goals to structurally transform African economies, and
has failed to keep up-to-date with engineering education for the twenty-first century. 82 For example, Kenya is estimated to have a short83
age of 30,000 engineers and 90,000 electricians.
The Chinese presence in Africa therefore offers an excellent
opportunity for technology and skills transfers in construction projects. These transfers could go beyond road building to construction
79.

See Andrew Teyie, You will go to jail, "Cowboy" contractors told, E. AFR.

STANDARD, Jan. 30, 2003, at 1; see also Raila Defends Influx of Chinese Road Workers,

TRADEMARK SOUTH AFRICA (May 27, 2011), http://www.trademarksa.org/news/raila-defends
-influx-chinese-road-builders.
80. GLOBAL WITNESS, TRANSPARENCY MATTERS: DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS TO
GOVERNMENTS BY CHINESE EXTRACTIVE COMPANIES (2013), available at http://

www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/transparency-matters-lr.pdf
(giving
a
balanced account of Chinese companies that have been involved in corruption and those that
have made extensive disclosures).
81. See generally ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE: How BIOTECHNOLOGY
IS BEING KEPT OUT OF AFRICA (1 st ed. 2008).
82.

F. C. Nyongesa, Engineering Board Living in a Time-Warp, DAILY NATION (Oct.

25, 2012) http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Engineering+Board+living+in+a+time+
warp/-/440808/1598204/-/oplc9u/-/index.html.
There is Chinese-African engineering
education cooperation underway. See Memorandum of Understanding Signed Between
China andAfrica on EngineeringEducation Cooperation,AFR. ENGINEERING EDUC. ASSOC.,

http://www.aeea.co.za/H/china-aeea.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
83. AJDB (African Development Bank) and Kenya Sign Multi-Million Dollar Loan
Agreement to Finance HydroelectricPower Project and Enhance Higher Education, AFR.
DEV. BANK (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-and-kenya-

sign-multi-million-dollar-loan-agreement-to-finance-hydroelectric-power-project-andenhance-higher-education- 10099/.
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of dams, ports and buildings. Indeed, they could extend to such
fields as agriculture, information and communications technology
and biotechnology. 84 Africa's Mining Vision envisages using natural
resources as a nucleus for strategic infrastructural development in areas such as energy, water and sanitation. 85 The African Union has
encouraged African countries to consider equity participation in mineral agreements with foreign investors as a way of a greater share of
benefits for African people. 86 China in part emerged as a leading
economy by developing a manufacturing or value-adding capacity
through joint ventures with foreign firms while undertaking the types
of initiatives contemplated in Africa's Mining Vision. To date, entry
into the Chinese market for foreign firms is highly conditional: foreign corporations in China must comply with strict Chinese restrictions on what particular entity forms may or may not do. 87 China's investment laws require foreign investments to be mutually
beneficial for China. 88 However, this mutual benefit condition that
appears in China's domestic joint venture law does not apply to Chinese investments overseas.89
84. Juma, supra note 64.
85.

See, e.g., AFRICAN UNION, AFRICA MINING VISION 4 (Feb. 2009), available at

http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv-resources/AMV/Africa%20Mining%20Vision%20e
nglish.pdf.
86. Paragraph four of the Addis Ababa Declaration, African Union [AU], Addis Ababa
Declarationon Building a SustainableFuturefor Africa's Extractive Industry--From Vision
to Action (Oct. 12-16, 2011), available at http://www.africaminingvision.org/amvresources/AMV/Declaration%20SecondFinal.pdf, calls on "Member States to explore
equity participation in mineral ventures so as to capture a greater share of the benefits for the
people of Africa."
87. See Starting a Business in China, DOINGBUSINESS.ORG, http://www.doing
business.org/data/exploreeconomies/china/starting-a-business (last visited Apr. 13, 2013);
see also Full Text:
Situation and Policies of China's Rare Earth Industry,
CHINAMINING.ORG, http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2012-06-20/1340183728d57513.ht
ml (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (discussing the Chinese government's policies over the
production and export of "rare earths").
88. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-related Economic Contracts
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 21, 1985, effective July 1,
1985), art. 1, available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-07-18/1153207665d
22.html; Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, and revised Apr.
4, 1990 and Mar. 15, 2001), art. 1, available at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/200607-18/1153206834d18.html.
89. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, revised Apr. 4,
1990 and Mar. 15, 2001), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI EN/Laws/
law en info.jsp?docid=51032. This law was adopted on July 1, 1979. The law has been
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It is therefore paradoxical for China to argue that its investment strategy in Africa is also based on the principle of mutual benefit. 90 Apparently what is good for China in China is not good enough
for China's investments in Africa. African governments must be vigilant to make sure China follows through on its mutual benefit promise. One of the best ways for Chinese-African relations to be mutually beneficial is to ensure that Africa receives the technology and
skills that build productivity enhancing opportunities. Since China
has shown a willingness to disregard promises to ensure mutual benefit, African governments must be vigilant. Enhancing firm-level
skills and technology would go a long way towards production for
exports. This would in turn help African economies grow on a sustainable basis. Such a strategy would create middle-class jobs and
lift many Africans out of poverty. In fact, as Webster argues, China
has addressed poverty quite effectively through precisely such a
strategy. 91 When African countries fail to take advantage of paths to
acquire technology and skills that China's relationship presents, they
undermine their ability to address their human rights challenges. African countries should use the leverage of access to their natural resources to structure investment and trade agreements with China and
foreign investors. These agreements would help African countries
build research and development capacities, acquire new management
capabilities for their firms as well as advanced technology and new
products with a view to creating competitive advantages and finally
increase developing country firm reputation from famous brands.
This two-pronged strategy-conditioning access to natural resources on skills transfer and permitting foreign ownership of business entities in exchange for skills transfer-is one of the paths available to so-called "late industrializers."
In recent decades, late
industrializers in Central and South America have allowed foreign
investment in manufacturing and other sectors as an opportunity for
technological learning and as a conscious mechanism for nurturing
productivity and growth. 92 Countries like Mexico, Argentina and
Chile developed reciprocity mechanisms to take advantage of such
foreign ownership of technology firms to subsidize technology learning and managerial skill formation at firm levels and human capital
amended twice, most recently in October 2000.
90. See China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Nov. 17, 2000), available at

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/tl 8053.htm.
91.

Webster, supra note 1, at 649-60.

92.

ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE REST 286 (2001).
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development. Reciprocity was the link between government support
and industrial performance. 93 As interventionist States, these late industrializers restricted this support to firms that achieved quality and
performance standards such as deepening local research and development, fostering technology transfers or improving managerial
skills. This support was monitored and winners were rewarded with
more support, for example, subsidized credit to support technology
acquisition. Losers were punished through the withdrawal of such
support. A good example to illustrate the success of this strategy is
the South Korean High Speed Rail Construction Authority, which entered into a consortium with a Franco-British firm to build highspeed rail. A major purpose of the consortium was to transfer technology skills in aerodynamic, civil, mechanical and automation engineering that could subsequently be applied in other sectors of the Korean economy. 94 In addition, the Korean company took advantage of
this multi-billion dollar, forty-six high-speed train, project to emerge
as the leader in high-speed rail in Asia. 95
The importance of developing productive capacities is recognized in the Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) for the Decade 2011-2020, from the Fourth United Nations
Conference on the Least Developed Countries (referred to as the Istanbul Plan of Action (IPoA)). 96 Since more than three-quarters of
the forty-eight LDCs are African countries, this agenda of improving
their productive capacity with a view to improving their human and
social development is particularly important to them. IPoA acknowledges that LDCs have the primary responsibility for their own development, while calling on their development partners such as China to
93. Id. at 292-93. Amsden divides late industrializers into two groups-those who
industrialized by pursuing an "independent" strategy of technological acquisition such as
China, India, Taiwan and Korea which sought to create a national technological base; and
those that pursued an "integrationist" strategy that brought in foreign firms to facilitate
technological learning like Chile, Argentina and Mexico. Id. at 14. An integrationist
strategy was followed in countries that did not have experience with technology. In this
sense, it would seem African countries, given their lack of experience with technology, are
more likely to develop such capacities through an integrationist approach.
94. See Alstom in Korea, ALSTOM (May 2012), http://www.alstom.com/Global/Group/
Resources/Documents/Factsheets/Korea.pdf (describing the variety of projects in addition to
the high speed rail that the consortium has undertaken).
95. See Daniel Rouach & David Saperstein, Alstom Technology Transfer Experience:
The Case of the Korean Train Express (KTX),

3 INT'L J. TECH.

TRANSFER &

COMMERCIALISATION 308 (2004).
96. Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Istanbul,
Turk., May 9-13, 2011, Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countriesfor the
Decade 2011-2020, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.219/3/Rev. I (May 23, 2011).
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"renewed and strengthened global partnership." 97 IPoA further
notes the importance of strengthening the private sector in LDCs as
well as the building of technological capacity as ways of "overcoming their marginalization." 98 IPoA identifies the following goals and
targets with respect to improving the productive capacity in LDCs:
" Increase significantly the value addition in natural
resource-based industries paying special attention
to employment generation;
" diversify local productive and export capability
with a focus on dynamic value added sectors in
agriculture, manufacturing and services;
" strive to increase total primary energy supply per
capita to the same level as other developing countries;
" strive to increase access to telecommunication services and strive to provide 100 per cent internet by
2020;
" significantly increase the share of electricity generation through renewable energy sources by
2020;
" enhance capacities in energy production, trade and
distribution with the aim of ensuring access to energy for all by 2030;
* ensure that the least developed countries have significant increase in combined rail and paved road
mileage and sea and air networks by 2020. 99
Virtually all African countries, whether they are an LDC or
not, have formulated Vision 2020 or 2030 plans that mirror these
goals. 00 These Vision Plans all aim to structurally transform African
97. Id. 10.

98. Id. IT 28(a), 26(g).
99. Id. 9 45(a)-(g).
100. See, e.g., KENYA VISION 2030, http://www.vision2030.go.ke (last visited Mar. 12,
2013); Vision 2030, NAT'L PLAN. COMM'N, http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision2030bgd.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2013); Ghana: Vision 2020 Minus 2015 Minus Vision

2010, MODERN GHANA (Mar.
15, 2011), http://www.modemghana.com/news/
320465/1/ghana-vision-2020-minus-2015-minus-vision-2010.html; INT'L FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INST., 2020 VISION NETWORK FOR EAST AFRICA, COUNTRY NOTE UGANDA (1998),
available at www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/pubs/2020/nw/uganda.pdf.
For Uganda, the
goal is "to accelerate socio-economic transformation to achieve the National Vision of a
transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modem and prosperous country within 30
years."
NATIONAL PLANNING AUTHORITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, NATIONAL
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economies within the next several decades from agrarian economies
or economies dependent on mineral or oil extraction to industrial
economies. There is also an African Manifesto for Science, Technology and Innovation, a multi-stakeholder initiative that promotes
sustainable development in Africa through the use of science, technology and innovation. 01 African leaders must take advantage of
China to "strengthen the institutional and managerial capacities and
the productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises." 102
These objectives can be met in a variety of ways. For instance, African firms could participate in joint ventures with Chinese
firms that use technology at different levels: in the day-to-day planning and management, in the design of projects and in the implementation and management of projects where Chinese technology and
knowledge is actually used. African countries can also work with
Chinese firms and the Chinese government to finance acquisition of
technologies that would enable African firms to become independent
and successful competitors, capable of undertaking the large infrastructural and construction projects currently being completed by
Chinese and non-African firms.
In addition, China could enhance its support for scientific,
technical and vocational education and training in Africa with a variety of programming. Increased and sustained Chinese financial support for these types of initiatives would be critical to ensuring that
African countries acquire the technology to industrialize as China
did. 03 Africa's current relations with China are likely to replicate its
relations with Western countries and, as such, close off paths to industrialization unless they are re-oriented.
Further, agriculture could also benefit from China's efforts to
develop a productive sector in Africa. China achieved food sufficiency in part by integrating its agricultural sector with other sectors
as part of its state-led, market-driven farmer-based model. This

DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1 (2010), availableat http://npa.ug/docs/NDP2.pdf.
101.

AFRICAN TECHNOLOGY STUDIES PROJECT, THE AFRICAN MANIFESTO FOR SCIENCE,

TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION (2010).

102. Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 20112020, supra note 96, 55(2)(b).
103. Since China is now a member of the World Trade Organization, it is also bound by
the commitments in the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS)
which in Article 66.2 provides for technology transfers to LDCs. Article 67 calls for
technical assistance. On the initiatives to support technology transfer reporting under Article
66 of TRIPS, see SUERIE MOON, MEANINGFUL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE LDCS: A
PROPOSAL FOR A MONITORING MECHANISM FOR TRIPS ARTICLE 66.2 (2011).
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model combined China's "advanced agricultural science and technology knowledge system."1 04 Linking system-wide improvements
and reforms in agriculture to the creation of productivity-enhancing
technology transfers between China and Africa has the potential to
inure to the benefit of agriculture, the largest source of employment
in Africa. China's positive experience in "productivity-based staple
crop-led agricultural development" could help unlock a huge potential mechanism for sustainably addressing human rights challenges. 105 The African agriculture sector provides a labor-intensive area
of the economy that, by following the Chinese model, has a large potential for high-value addition through continual technology innovation. 106 Just as in the mineral sector, this will require moving towards value-added agricultural production techniques through
technological learning, entrepreneurship and innovation which African agricultural research centers and universities can bring to farmers. 10 7 African governments will therefore have to do more than
simply reduce the cost of doing business, but also must become active facilitators of technological learning. 108
Many African governments may not have the capacity to negotiate the complex and innovative contracts, syndications or project
valuations involved in resource extraction and other large projects.
This lack of capacity may hinder the governments in becoming active
facilitators of technological learning. This is not an insurmountable
problem. The World Bank has established funds and programs to
address this shortcoming.' 09 The African Development Bank (AfDB)
is doing its part funding projects to support science, technology and
innovation.1 10 In addition, there is a large pool of African experts in
104.

LI XIAOYUN

ET AL., AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA AND AFRICA:

A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 51 (2012).

105. Id.
106.
107.

Id. at 262.
For another excellent proposal to reform African agriculture through innovation,

see CALESTOUS JUMA, THE NEW HARVEST: AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION IN AFRICA (2011).

108.

Calestous Juma, Innovation Key to Unlocking Africa's Horticultural Potential,

FRESHFRUITPORTAL.COM

(Aug. 23,

2012),

http://www.freshfruitportal.com/opinion-inn

ovation-is-key-to-unlocking-africa%E2%80%99s-horticultural-potential.
109. Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Launches New Fund to Help African
Countries Negotiate Best-Possible Deals for their Oil, Gas, and Minerals, (Oct. 5, 2012),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/10/05/world-bank-launches-fund-afric
an-countries-negotiate-deals-for-oil-gas-minerals.
110. AfDB (African Development Bank) and Kenya Sign Multi-Million Dollar Loan
Agreement to Finance Hydroelectric Power Project and Enhance Higher Education,
AFRICAN DEV. BANK (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-
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the private and inter-governmental sectors as well as agencies such as
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) that can provide the requisite expertise to negotiate and
seal such deals.
So far, I have argued that there are at least two types of governance issues that intersect with Chinese investment in Africa. First,
as discussed in Part I, the resource curse divorces governments from
the people they govern and this, in turn, facilitates corruption. This
curse inhibits African governments from negotiating deals that would
lead to long-term economic growth, and more importantly, to the
economic empowerment of Africans citizens. Second, quite frequently, governments lack the technical capacity to negotiate deals
that would provide such growth. Where this capacity is available,
professionals lack the autonomy to negotiate and structure investment
agreements that would help African countries take advantage of the
technological skills of foreign investors and turn them into a source
of competitive advantage.
To overcome these challenges and to improve human rights in
the long-term, China's engagement in Africa has to be retargeted towards increasing economic growth. This retargeting is the best longterm solution to widespread poverty and human rights challenges. At
the moment, the primary orientation of China's interest in Africa is
extracting resources from the continent and sending its enterprises,
professionals and products to Africa. This Chinese investment strategy does not satisfy African desires or needs. Growing African
economies through joint ventures and productivity-increasing investments is the best guarantee to improve social and economic conditions. This is exactly what China has done at home. It has invested
heavily in acquiring technology and knowledge for production and
innovation. This helped China move from primary production with
unskilled labor to knowledge-intensive production with skilled labor.
China is therefore well-placed to help engineer African economies by
investing in productivity-enhancing technology transfers in foundational economic indusrties such as construction.111 Such investments
would help train a high-caliber African workforce and help build a
middle class that would otherwise continue living in or near poverty.

and-kenya-sign-multi-million-dollar-loan-agreement-to-finance-hydroelectric-powerproject-and-enhance-higher-education- 10099.
111. One initiative that could be used for the transfer of skills and technology are special
economic zones. Deborah Bradtigam, African Shenzhen: China 's Special Economic Zones
in Africa, 49 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 27 ,(2011), available at http://www.afriquechine.net/
en/201 1/African-Shenzhen-China-s-special-economic-zones-in-Africa.pdf.
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Thus, in addition to the support China is already giving to help develop African capacity in science and technology by creating educational opportunities in China, much more is possible. African countries must take advantage of China's technological proficiency in
order to develop their own skills. 112 In short, China should not "kick
the ladder" 113 it used to climb to its present level of economic wealth
just when Africa needs it most.
CONCLUSION

China's human rights imprint in Africa is evolving. It is,
however, too early to suggest that the record is as positive as Webster
suggests. By downplaying human rights issues, China has put its
immediate economic interests ahead of Africa's long-term growth
challenges. Webster underestimates the importance of this fact. By
disavowing human rights, China has ineluctably legitimized the default position of many resource-rich African countries: complacency,
due to the fact that resource richness weakens their incentive to diversify their economies. This, in turn, postpones the need to develop
higher productivity sectors that would be better for human rights in
the long-term. Webster likewise underestimates the importance of
this fact.
To address Africa's development and human rights challenges, African countries must capitalize on the trade and investment opportunities China and other countries provide. African countries can
do so by taking concerted measures to leave behind their dependency
on primary products and to develop a productive base upon which
competitive industries could emerge. These actions would promote
the kind of growth that inures positively for human rights. In July,
2012, at the last China-Africa forum, Chinese leaders promised that a
new chapter in Chinese-African relations was beginning. In this
chapter, China would seek to help Africa improve its productive capacity by "scaling up personnel training and technology transfer." 14
112. See INTER-ACADEMY COUNCIL, INVENTING A BETTER FUTURE: A STRATEGY FOR
BUILDING WORLDWIDE CAPACITY IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2004), available at

http://www.interacademycouncil.net/24026/25995/25996/26142.aspx
(arguing
that
technologically proficient countries like China should help countries without such
capabilities to prevent the expansion of the growing gap between rich and poor countries).
113. CHANG H., KICKING THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (2002).

114. An Lu, Chinese PremierMeets South African President on Boosting Ties (July 19,
2012), http://english.gov.cn/2012-07/19/content_2187505.htm. The Group of 77 and China
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This commitment will be crucial to assuring that China's contact with
Africa goes towards promoting human rights in the long-term. African governments must work closely with the Chinese government as
well as Chinese firms to make this happen. China's human rights
policy with respect to Africa must take into account that the same
rights China has invoked to defend itself in the global trading system
should apply equally in its relations with African countries. 115 Under
China's policy of mutual benefit, African countries should make it
clear to China that they have the right to freely dispose of their natural resources as a matter of international law.11 6 As I have argued,
the negotiation, design, planning, implementation, operation and
management of infrastructural or other technology projects undertaken by foreign investors present opportunities for technological learning and transfer from foreign investors to African countries. African
countries must capitalize on these opportunities to develop their
technological capabilities with a view to establishing long-term
growth. This would, in turn, help these countries meet their human
rights obligations.
Webster notes that the Declaration on the Right to Development is very relevant to the discussion of China's role in Africa. I
cannot agree more. However, one must do more than merely catalogue examples in which China has affirmed clauses of the Declaration. The Declaration to the Right to Development gives States the
"primary responsibility for the creation of national and international
conditions favourable for the realization of the right to development."117 It allows them to take steps "individually or collectively,
to formulate international development policies with a view to facili-

have identified the need to ensure that structural transformation of African economies does
not produce adverse effects. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Statement of
the Group of 77 and China, 59th Session of the Trade and Development Board (Sept. 20,
2012),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/tdb59_item_6_G77%20and%20China_
en.pdf.
115. See Qin, supra note 67.
116. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1.2, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation based on the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.").
See also id. art. 25 (providing that nothing in this Covenant "shall be interpreted as
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
wealth and resources"). China ratified the ICESCR in March 2001.
117. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, GAOR, 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986), art. 3(1).
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tating the full realization of the right to development," " 8 as well as
to formulate, adopt and" implement "policy, legislative and other
measures at the national and international levels" in order to realize
the "progressive enhancement of the right to development." 119 This
response to Webster has suggested that African States and China
have yet to begin adopting the kind of long-term policies that facilitate the full realization of the vision embodied in the Right to Development. Ensuring that human beings are the central beneficiaries of
the right to development, as contemplated by the Declaration on the
Right to Development, requires re-orienting Africa-China relations to
engage in the type of poverty-reducing and productivity-increasing
long-term strategies and investments proposed in this response. This
is particularly important because, although China claims its African
relations are mutually beneficial, unlike African countries' relations
with the Western countries, the bilateral investment treaties China
has signed with African countries are no different from those treaties
between African countries and Western countries. 120 African countries therefore stand in the same jeopardy for violating these treaties
with China as they do with Western countries. This is yet another
reason not to treat too seriously the claims of Chinese human rights
exceptionalism in Africa and to begin re-defining the relationship to
Africa's long-term benefit.

118.

Id. at art. 4(1).

119.

Id. atart. 10.

120.

Ewelukwa, supra note 35, at 528.

